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Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech:
Free Enterprise Values in the Doctrine
of Free Speech
Peaceful labor picketing,' once treated as an exercise of freedom of
speech, has been implicitly relegated by the Supreme Court to the status
of an economic activity subject to extensive regulation. This doctrine
should be seriously reexamined, particularly in light of more recent devel-
opments giving full First Amendment protection to peaceful non-labor
picketing and substantial First Amendment protection to commercial
advertising.
This Note argues that consumer picketing' that does not coerce the lis-
tener 3 is expression entitled to First Amendment protection.' In reaching
1. "Picketing" encompasses a broad range of activities, see Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
101 n.18 (1940), but is generally characterized by one or more persons walking or standing near a
given locality while displaying a sign. For the purposes of this Note, "peaceful labor picketing" is
defined as all such activity carried on by members or agents of a labor union in connection with a
labor dispute, when unaccompanied by threats, harassment, violence, or other physically coercive
conduct.
2. "Consumer picketing" takes place at consumer entrances only, and informs consumers of a
strike or other labor dispute involving the employees of the picketed business or, in the case of secon-
dary consumer picketing, see infra note 33, of the business' suppliers or customers.
The First Amendment analysis advanced by this Note focuses on consumer picketing. Picketing
directed toward employees and designed to induce a work stoppage raises two issues that do not arise
in the case of consumer picketing. First, the union may be able to enforce economic sanctions against
union members who cross picket lines, thus arguably introducing an element of coercion into even
peaceful picketing. Second, the conduct the picket seeks to induce is sometimes a breach of contract
and often less clearly legal than the consumer's decision not to patronize a picketed business. Whether
and to what extent these factors alter the balance of First Amendment protection is beyond the scope
of this Note.
3. Different courts and commentators use "coercion" to mean vastly different things. See infra
notes 40-41. This Note adopts a conventional definition: consumer picketing is coercive rather than
peaceful only if the picketers' conduct "overwhelms the will" of the consumers. See Jones, Picketing
and Coercion: A Jurisprudence of Epithets, 39 VA. L. REV. 1023, 1028 (1953). This definition does
not apply to picketing that is wholly peaceful but that nevertheless causes some timid consumers to
shy away, or to otherwise peaceful picketing that involves "isolated incidents of abuse." See infra note
76.
4. Several commentators have seriously questioned the constitutionality of restrictions on consumer
picketing. See, e.g., T. ENERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 444-49 (1970) (con-
sumer picketing, like non-labor picketing, should be fully protected); Mack & Lieberwitz, Secondary
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this conclusion, the Note rejects both the argument that labor picketing is
inherently coercive and the Court's recent suggestion that labor picketing
does not concern a public issue. The Note maintains that the failure to
extend constitutional protection to consumer picketing, when viewed to-
gether with the increased protection given commercial advertising, reveals
substantive economic policy judgments made in the guise of First Amend-
ment adjudication.
I. Labor Picketing and Commercial Advertising: A Reordering of Con-
stitutional Priorities
In the early part of this century, beginning with Lochner v. New York,'
the Supreme Court elevated to constitutional status the common-law right
of an employer to compete in the economic marketplace free from unjusti-
fied interference. Under the now discredited doctrine of "substantive due
process," the Court struck down as unconstitutional economic and social
legislation that interfered with this right.7 Lower federal and state courts,
under Supreme Court guidance, routinely enjoined as tortious labor activ-
ity' that interfered with the employer's right of free enterprise.' In the
Consumer Picketing: The First Amendment Questions Remain, 32 MERCER L. REV. 815 (1981)
(economic impact on business is arbitrary basis for constitutional adjudication); Note, Political Boycott
Activity and the First Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 659, 682-83 (1978) (peaceful secondary con-
sumer picketing, like non-labor political boycott, protected under First Amendment). None of these
commentators considers the significance of developing First Amendment protection of commercial
speech, or inquires into the economic values underlying these two doctrines.
5. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (state law prescribing maximum hours for bakery
employees struck down as violation of due process).
6. Under the doctrine of tortious interference with business relations, see generally 86 C.J.S.
Torts § 43 (1954), which developed primarily as a judicial response to the growth of the labor move-
ment, see generally Note, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury: The Transformation of Property, Contract and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1529-37 (1980),
labor activity that harmed a business was generally considered tortious, whereas harmful activity by
competitors, often even in combination, was privileged. See id. at 1523-33.
7. See, e.g., Adkins v. Childrens Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (minimum wage for women uncon-
stitutional); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921) (statute prohibiting injunctions against peaceful
picketing unconstitutional); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (state law prohibiting employers
from requiring employees to sign contract promising not to join union ("yellow dog contract") uncon-
stitutional); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (federal law prohibiting railroad employers
from requiring "yellow dog contracts" unconstitutional).
8. See, e.g., American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921)
(union limited to one picket); Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917) (union
organizing of workers who had signed "yellow dog contracts" enjoined as interference with employer's
constitutional right to run non-union business); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418
(1911) (union's publicity of boycott enjoined); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (strike enjoined as
interference with business). See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION
1 (1930) (pervasive use of labor injunction known by labor movement and sympathizers as "govern-
ment by injunction").
9. Substantive due process protected employers primarily from state action. But the constitutional
protection accorded the employer's right of free enterprise was invoked to protect the employer from
union action as well. First, the promotion of this common-law right to constitutional status was re-
garded as confirming the importance of the employer's right, thus strengthening support for injunc-
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mid-1930's, the Supreme Court began to repudiate its constitutional pro-
tection of business interests both from economic and social legislation °
and from labor activity." Current First Amendment doctrine concerning
labor picketing and commercial advertising, however, has largely revived
the Lochner era's hierarchy of protected values.
A. Labor Picketing: The Rise and Fall of Thornhill
Throughout the nineteenth century, peaceful picketing was regulated as
a coercive economic activity. 2 Although it acquired greater legitimacy as
the labor movement gained power and public support,'3 peaceful picketing
tions against union activity. See Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 251 (1917)
(citing substantive due process cases in support of injunction against union). Second, a statute prohib-
iting injunctions against labor activity such as picketing was itself held to be state action violating the
employer's constitutional right to be free of such interference. See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312
(1921).
10. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (minimum wage constitu-
tional; overruling Adkins v. Childrens Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502, 537 (1934) (price regulation constitutional).
11. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937), effectively reversed Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921). Although Senn held merely that a state anti-injunction act was not a
taking of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment, the Court stated that "[m]embers of a union
might, without special statutory authorization by a State, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for
freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution." Id. at 478. On the basis of this dictum,
a few state courts extended First Amendment protection to peaceful picketing. See Denver Local 13 v.
Perry Truck Lines, 106 Colo. 25, 101 P.2d 436 (1940). Others ignored it completely. See Roth v.
Retail Clerks Local 1460, 216 Ind. 363, 24 N.E.2d 280 (1939).
12. In the nineteenth century, all picketing was treated as tortious. See Gregory, Constitutional
Limitations on the Regulation of Union and Employer Conduct, 49 MICH. L. REV. 191, 198 (1950);
supra note 6. Following the approach of then Judge Holmes in his dissent in Vegelahn v. Guntner,
167 Mass. 92, 104-09, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079-82 (1896), and in his article, Privilege, Malice, and
Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894), some courts began to accept, under certain circumstances, the
economic interests of labor unions as a justification, like reasonable competition, for otherwise tortious
interference. See F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 8, at 24-31. Even those courts that were
comparatively reluctant to enjoin peaceful picketing balanced the economic interests of the union
against those of the picketed business. See Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d 910
(1937) (secondary consumer picketing directed only to product of primary employer justified by secon-
dary employer's "unity of interest" with primary employer). Thus, peaceful picketing was, at best,
treated as "a legitimate means of economic coercion," see F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note
8, at 31, the legality of which depended on the economic objective of the union.
13. Congress first attempted to limit the use of injunctions against picketing and other labor activ-
ity in the Clayton Antitrust Act, §§ 6, 20, Pub. L. No. 212, 38 Stat. 731, 738 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 17, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976)) (exempting labor from Sherman Antitrust Act
and limiting federal court jurisdiction to issue labor injunctions). But these provisions of the Clayton
Act were given a limited interpretation by the courts, which continued to issue labor injunctions. See
A. GOLDMAN, TIHE SUPREME COURT AND LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 16 (1976). More specific
curbs on the federal courts were included in the Anti-Injunction (Norris-LaGuardia) Act, Pub. L.
No. 65, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976)). Several state
legislatures also passed anti-injunction acts, modelled after the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which limited
the jurisdiction of state courts to issue labor injunctions. See Smith & DeLancey, The State Legisla-
tures and Unionism, 38 MICH. L. REV. 987, 1013-20 (1940).
Unions began to fare better during this period in the courts as well as the legislatures. State courts
that once treated all picketing as a prima facie tort began to recognize the union's economic objective
of improving the wages and working conditions of its members as a legal justification under some
circumstances for interference with business relations. See supra note 12.
Labor Picketing
was still treated during the Lochner era as an exercise not of free speech
but of economic power alone. With the demise of substantive due process,
however, the Supreme Court extended First Amendment protection to or-
ganized labor activities that had previously been subject to injunctions.'4
In Thornhill v. Alabama, the Court proclaimed that "the dissemination
of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as
within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion,"' 5 and struck down as unconstitutionally overbroad a state anti-pick-
eting statute.' 6 The Court in Thornhill rejected any suggestion that pick-
eting is not entitled to First Amendment protection because it may induce
others to take action that harms the picketed business:
It may be that effective exercise of the means of advancing public
knowledge may persuade some of those reached to refrain from en-
tering into advantageous relations with the business establishment
which is the scene of the dispute. Every expression of opinion on
matters that are important has the potentiality of inducing action in
the interests of one rather than another group in society. But the
group in power at any moment may not impose penal sanctions on
peaceful and truthful discussion of matters of public interest merely
on a showing that others may thereby be persuaded to take action
inconsistent with its interests.'7
Although its holding was on the narrow ground of overbreadth, Thornhill
established that restrictions on picketing were subject to the constraints of
the First Amendment.'
14. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (state may not, consistent with First
Amendment, require union organizers to register before soliciting union membership); Hague v. CIO,
307 U.S. 496 (1939) (privileges and immunities clause of Fourteenth Amendment protects union
circulars and mass meetings called by union organizers).
15. 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
16. Id. at 105. The overbreadth doctrine recognizes the danger that protected speech may be
"chilled" by the very existence of statutes that sweep within their prohibition protected expression.
Thus, a litigant may challenge such a statute on its face, even if the particular activity with which the
litigant is charged is not constitutionally protected. See id. at 96-98; see also Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518 (1972) (applying overbreadth analysis). See generally Note, The First Amendment Over-
breadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
17. 310 U.S. at 104. It is well established in First Amendment doctrine that constitutional protec-
tion extends beyond "abstract discussion" to speech that advocates action. See, e.g., NAACP v. Clai-
borne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3424 (1982) (boycott of white merchants); Organization for a
Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (leafleting to force real estate broker to stop
"blockbusting"); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963) (solicitation of legal clients); Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945) (solicitation of union membership); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S.
242, 259 (1940) (solicitation of Communist Party membership). Thus, speech generally may not be
regulated merely because of the reaction of the listeners to its message. See infra pp. 951-52. This
protection extends even to advocacy of illegal action, "except where such advocacy is directed to incit-
ing or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
18. A decision that a statute is overbroad in violation of the First Amendment does not necessarily
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 91: 938, 1982
But those who greeted Thornhill with enthusiasm 9 were soon disap-
pointed."0 Within ten years, the Court had adopted an extremely lenient
standard of constitutionality for restrictions on labor picketing:1 any pick-
eting having an "illegal objective" was not protected by the First Amend-
ment.22 In its earliest formulation, this illegal objective test denied First
Amendment protection to any picketing whose object and imminent effect
was to force the picketed employer to violate an important state law. 3
The doctrine was soon enlarged, however, and now includes any picketing
aimed at pressuring the employer to do something that, while entirely le-
gal, was judged by either the legislature or the enjoining court to be better
hold that the particular actor's conduct was privileged. See Note, supra note 16, at 845. But the Court
in Thornhill indicated that peaceful picketing itself was a protected means of communication. See 310
U.S. at 99. The protected status of peaceful picketing was made explicit in Carlson v. California, 310
U.S. 106, 112-13 (1940) (companion case to Thornhill).
Following Thornhill, several Supreme Court cases upheld and expanded the First Amendment
right to picket. See, e.g., Cafeteria Employees Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943) (First
Amendment right to picket not lost because of isolated incidents of abuse); Bakery Drivers Local 802
v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942) (right to picket not lost merely because union picketed bakeries that
supplied peddlers with whom union had immediate dispute); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941)
(right to picket not lost merely because no immediate dispute between employer and employees).
19. See, e.g., Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent, 56 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1943); Jaffe,
In Defense of the Supreme Court's Picketing Doctrine, 41 MIH. L. REV. 1037 (1943). But see
Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 HARV. L. REV. 180 (1942) (criticizing Thornhill).
20. Thornhill had little impact upon the state courts, in which most picketing cases were heard.
Many continufed to uphold injunctions against picketing, either distinguishing or ignoring Thornhill.
See Tanenhaus, Picketing-Free Speech: The Growth of the New Law of Picketing from 1940 to
1952, 38 CORNIEL L.Q. 1 (1952) (Thornhill "was more dud than bombshell" in state courts).
21. Looking at Thornhill with the benefit of hindsight, one can discern a loophole that later cases
expanded into a cavernous gap. The Court conceded that
the rights of employers and employees to conduct their economic affairs and to compete with
others for a share in the products of industry are subject to modification or qualification in the
interest of the society in which they exist. This is but an instance of the power of the State to
set the limits of permissible contest open to industrial combatants.
310 U.S. at 103-04. This passage was cited frequently in later decisions limiting the right to picket,
see, e.g., Carpenters & Joiners Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 728 (1942). Those cases
failed, however, to heed the caveat that directly followed that passage: "It does not follow that the
State in dealing with the evils arising from industrial disputes may impair the effective exercise of the
right to discuss freely industrial relations which are matters of public concern." 310 U.S. at 104.
22. The illegal objective doctrine was developed in the state courts partly in response to Thornhill.
See Gregory, supra note 12, at 201. The doctrine was, however, only a slight refinement of the
common-law analysis by which many state courts permitted extensive restrictions on picketing before
Thornhill. See supra note 12. Indeed, it appears that most state courts virtually ignored Thornhill and
continued to enjoin peaceful picketing under much the same terms as before. See supra note 20.
23. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949). In Giboney, the union sought
agreements from wholesale ice distributors not to sell ice to non-union ice peddlers. The Missouri
court had held that such agreements violated the state anti-trade-restraint statute. Id. at 492-93.
When Empire, a wholesale ice distributor, refused to sign such an agreement, the union peacefully
picketed its place of business, reducing Empire's business by 85% when union truckdrivers refused to
deliver goods to Empire.
It has been suggested that the illegal objective test as first announced in Giboney was closely pat-
terned after the "clear and present danger" test then generally applied under the First Amendment, in
that the Court seemed to require that the state interest be important, and that the threat of its viola-
tion be imminent. See Jones, The Right to Picket-Twilight Zone of the Constitution, 102 U. PA. L.
REV. 995, 1021 (1954).
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left to the employer's free choice.24 Under the current illegal objective test,
neither the importance of the state policy nor the means chosen to advance
that policy are subjected to judicial scrutiny."s The test has thus become
circular and wholly deferential to legislative action. 26 The state, whose ac-
tions the First Amendment is intended to limit, is now free to establish the
parameters of First Amendment protection for labor picketing. 7
The First Amendment analysis of picketing in Thornhill focused upon
the relationship between the union as speaker and its intended listen-
ers-the workers or consumers to whom the union's message was di-
rected.28 The illegal objective test, however, considers only the economic
relationship between the union and the picketed business.2" The listen-
ers-their right to be informed " and their instrumental role in the effec-
24. See Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950). In Hughes, a Black citizens group pick-
eted a store that refused to hire Blacks in proportion to their population in the area. An injunction
was upheld by the Supreme Court on the basis of the state court's declaration that it was an illegal
objective to seek hiring on the basis of race. In contrast to Giboney, the employer would not have
violated any statute by acceding to the demands of the picketers and those who honored the picket. See
also Teamsters Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 478-79 (1950) (illegal objective to pressure self-
employer to join union). In Hanke, the picketed employer was legally entitled to join the union, but
the picketing had been enjoined on the basis of the state's "public policy" in favor of self-employment.
Commentators sharply criticized these developments in the Court's picketing doctrine. See Fraenkel,
Peaceful Picketing-Constitutionally Protected? 99 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1950) (illegal objective test
undermines constitutional protection of peaceful picketing).
25. Compare Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) ("placards used as
an essential and inseparable part of a grave offense against an important public law") with Teamsters
Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 478 (1950) (decision to protect self-employers from picketing is
"within the domain of a State's public policy").
26. Federal labor legislation, which preempts conflicting state law, see San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over activities arguably
protected or prohibited by NLRA); see also R. GORMAN, BA.IC: TEXT ON LABOR LAW 766-86 (1976)
(discussing labor law preemption doctrine), currently protects primary picketing in connection with a
legal strike, see 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). Under current doctrine, however, the First Amendment
apparently poses no barrier to the removal of that protection.
27. This development was noted over 30 years ago:
We have travelled a long way. For a time it seemed as though peaceful picketing were going to
receive real constitutional protection. Now it looks as though state courts, by the simple device
of declaring union objectives contrary to public policy, can ban peaceful picketing in almost all
situations where there is room for difference of opinion as to these objectives. We seem to be
on the road back to government by injunction.
Fraenkel, supra note 24, at 12. See also Armstrong, Where Are We Going with Picketing? 36 CALIF.
L. REV. 1, 37 (1948) (only objectives that would create imminent danger of extremely serious social
evil should be grounds for injunction under First Amendment).
28. See 310 U.S. at 101-05 (recognizing effect on listeners and listeners' interest in receiving
information).
29. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 295 (1957) (picketing of self-employed
person may be prohibited); Electric Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951) (picketing may be pro-
hibited where picketed business merely sells struck employer's product).
30. Listeners' First Amendment rights have an uncertain status. Some cases suggest that there is
an independent constitutional right to receive information or opinions. See, e.g., Board of Educ., Is-
land Trees School Dist. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799, 2808 (1982) (plurality held First Amendment rights
of listeners limit school board's power to remove books from school library); Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972) (First Amendment rights of listeners implicated when state excludes
foreign speaker); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (First Amendment protects private
possession of obscene materials); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (domestic subserib-
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tiveness of the picket 31-have disappeared from the analysis completely.
Under the illegal objective test, restrictions on picketing have been ac-
corded the deference customarily granted to economic regulations."
The First Amendment issues neglected by the Court's current analysis
are most starkly posed by examining its discussion of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) prohibition on peaceful secondary consumer pick-
eting33 in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees, Local 1001 (Safeco). 4 The
Court in Safeco held that the union had violated the NLRA by peacefully
picketing on the public sidewalk s in front of the consumer entrances of
the surety companies that sold insurance policies issued by Safeco, the
struck employer. 6 The pickets informed the public of the strike by Safeco
employees; accompanying handbills, not proscribed by the NLRA, asked
ers constitutionally entitled to receive foreign publications). Other cases, while stressing the rights of
listeners, seem to indicate that those rights are contingent upon the rights of the speaker. See, e.g.,
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 757 (1976)
("If there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising . . . .") In
general, the rights of listeners are not explicitly considered, although such rights would seem implicit
in the philosophical foundations of the First Amendment. See Emerson, Legal Foundations of the
Right to Know, 1976 WASI. U. L.Q. 1 (1976).
31. The listener must respond positively to the union's message in order for a peaceful, non-
coercive picket to be effective. One must therefore ask whether it is possible for one person to coerce
another by means of the voluntary action of an intervening person. See Jones, supra note 3, at 1047-
49. The only possible affirmative answer, that picketing can be regulated because it starts the chain of
coercion, see Gregory, Picketing and Coercion: A Conclusion, 39 VA. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (1953), begs
the question. An inducement to lawful action is generally protected by the First Amendment. See
supra note 17.
32. Cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3425-26 (1982) (characterizing
labor picketing as subject to states' "broad power to regulate economic activity").
33. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976). "Secondary consumer picketing" takes place at the con-
sumer entrances of a business legally neutral in the labor dispute publicized by the picket. By con-
trast, primary picketing takes place at the site of the employer with which the union has a dispute.
See generally R. GORMAN, supra note 26, at 257-61 (describing protected primary picketing and
prohibited secondary picketing). The secondary employer generally uses or sells the products or ser-
vices of the primary employer. Because the primary employer often does not sell its products directly
to the consumer, a secondary consumer picket is frequently the only direct way to reach the members
of the public who use the primary employer's product.
34. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
35. The union's picketing, like that in the other labor picketing cases, took place in what is re-
garded under the First Amendment as a "public forum": "Wherever the title of streets and parks may
rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions." Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939), quoted in Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460
(1980). In general, the government violates the First Amendment when it prohibits picketing in a
public forum based on the content of the picket's message. See infra pp. 951-52. Picketing on private
property, however-even in a shopping center, which might be regarded as the modern functional
equivalent of a public forum-is not protected by the First Amendment. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424
U.S. 507 (1976). But see Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308
(1968) (overruled by Hudgens) (labor picketing otherwise legal may not be prohibited solely because
it takes place on private property that serves function of public forum). Cf. Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (federal constitution not violated by state constitutional provi-
sion protecting speech in private shopping center).
36. 447 U.S. at 609-10.
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consumers to cancel their Safeco policies.' Because the surety companies
were dependent for ninety percent of their business on the sale of Safeco
policies, the picketing was held to have the illegal objective38 of coercing
the "neutral" employer."
Although the Court in Safeco appeared to be concerned only with the
economic coercion of the picketed business that may result from consum-
ers' response to the picket,40 its application of the illegal objective test may
37. Id. at 610 n.3.
38. Id. at 60'. The extent to which the surety companies could be affected by the picketing ena-
bled the Court to distinguish its decision in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 (Tree
Fruits), 377 U.S. 58 (1964) (construing NLRA to permit peaceful consumer picketing at secondary
site if aimed only at primary product). In Tree Fruits, the picketing was expressly limited to the
Washington State apples sold by the secondary employer, Safeway grocery stores. The apples consti-
tuted a tiny portion of Safeway's business. If the union was entirely successful in accomplishing its
purpose, the reduction of sales of Washington apples, Safeway would not be "coerced," but might
"drop the item as poor seller." Id. at 72-73. The Court cited "concern that a broad ban against
peaceful picketing might collide with the guarantees of the First Amendment," id. at 63, in support of
its narrow reading of NLRA § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). Three members of the Court-Black, Harlan, and
Stewart-found the Court's construction and reading of legislative history unconvincing. Commenta-
tors generally agreed with them that Congress had intended to prohibit all consumer picketing at
secondary sites. See The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 290-291 (1964) (Justice
Brennan's opinion "required disregarding the remarks of key opponents of the bill and construing the
statements of key supporters both narrowly and technically").
39. 447 U.S. at 616. Although the picketed surety companies were "neutral" as defined by the
NLRA, id. at 610, Safeco owned substantial amounts of stock-up to 53%-in each company, and
Safeco representatives sat on each company's board of directors. Retail Store Employees Local 1001,
226 N.L.R.B. 754, 755 (1976). Furthermore, the fact that the picketed companies were wholly depen-
dent on Safeco for their business suggests that the companies were not neutral, in the common sense of
the word, in the dispute between Safeco and its employees. Indeed, it has been suggested that prohibit-
ing picketing in the Safeco situation while allowing it in the Tree Fruits situation, see supra note 38,
"creates the odd result that the more neutral a party seems the more likely it is to become involved in
another party's labor dispute." Case Comment, Consumer Picketing of Economically Interdependent
Parties: Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v. NLRB (Safeco Title Insurance Co.), 32 STAN. L. RE-.V.
631, 637 (1980).
One might argue, in support of allowing secondary consumer picketing, that to the extent an em-
ployer ties the success of its own business to the fortunes of a certain supplier or manufacturer, that
employer has a "unity of interest" with the manufacturer, cf. Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281,
11 N.E.2d 910 (1937) (striking down injunction against secondary picketing on ground of "unity of
interest"), and "assumes the risks. . . that follow when labor conflict embroils the manufacturer.
." Safeco, 447 U.S. at 623 (Brennan, J., dissenting). These arguments are, of course, issues of policy
and statutory construction unrelated to the constitutional issue analyzed here.
40. 447 U.S. at 616. The Court has long been concerned with the "coercive" economic effect of
picketing. Compare Bakery Drivers Local 609 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 773 (1942) (no significant loss
of business; picketing protected) with Carpenters & Joiners Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722,
724 (1942) (business cut by 60%; picketing unprotected) and Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,
336 U.S. 490, 493 (1949) (business cut by 85%; picketing unprotected). Eventually, the Court
dropped this inquiry into the actual effect of the picket; the intended effect-the result, that is, if all
listeners were successfully persuaded by the picket's information and appeal-was sufficient in Safeco
to establish illegality.
Yet the economic effect, actual or intended, of a peaceful consumer picket has no bearing on
whether it is communication and should not be relevant in determining its level of protection under
the First Amendment. See infra p. 952. The Thornhill Court appeared to embrace this position. 310
U.S. 88, 104 (1940) (picketing may not be prohibited merely because information may lead others to
withhold patronage or labor). Later cases, however, suggest that labor picketing that has an economic
impact the State wishes to avoid is for that reason something other than communication. In Teamsters
Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 289-93 (1957), the Court reviewed its labor picketing decisions since
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have been based on an implicit assumption that such a picket always co-
erces the consumers themselves." Yet there was no suggestion that the
consumers in Safeco were in any way threatened, harassed, or even per-
suaded to honor the pickets' appeal. Not a single link in the chain of
events the union hoped to set in motion-consumers cancelling their
Safeco policies, the surety companies pressuring Safeco to settle the strike,
Safeco consequently settling on terms more favorable to the union-was
itself illegal.42 Furthermore, it may only have been at the site of the "neu-
tral" employer that the union could communicate effectively with the con-
sumers of the primary product. Nevertheless, the First Amendment chal-
lenge to the validity of this section of the NLRA, squarely faced for the
first time in Safeco,43 was disposed of in a few terse sentences about the
union's illegal objective of coercing the secondary "neutral" employer.4
1921. Noting, for instance, that the picketed business in Carpenters & Joiners Local 213 v. Ritter's
Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942), which suffered substantial economic loss as a result of the peaceful picket-
ing, was legally neutral in the dispute, the Court concluded that such picketing "involved little, if any
'communication.'" 354 U.S. 284, 290 (1957).
41. See 447 US. at 618-19 (Stevens, J., concurring); infra p. 953. In the Safeco case itself, picket-
ing outside the entrance could not coerce consumers to cancel their Safeco policies inside the building.
But in other cases of secondary consumer picketing, the consumer could be coerced as well as per-
suaded to withdraw her patronage by, for instance, simply not entering a picketed store.
The suggestion that picketing may coerce the listeners had appeared already in Bakery Drivers
Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1941):
Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particu-
lar locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or
another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated. Hence
those aspects of picketing make it the subject of restrictive regulation.
Id. at 776-77 (Douglas, J. concurring). Douglas was careful to distinguish between conduct that may
coerce the listeners and the economic "coercion" or pressure on the picketed business that may result
from persuasion of the listeners. Consistent with Thornhill, he denied that the latter form of "coer-
cion" was sufficient to justify restrictions on peaceful picketing. Id. Later cases, however, have mani-
festly confused the possibility, noted by Douglas, that picketing may induce a response independent of
its message with the effect that a response based on that message may have on the picketed business.
See Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 289-90 (1957) (denying communicative nature of
picket against "neutral" party).
Many commentators have focused on the question of coercion in analyzing the First Amendment
status of picketing. See, e.g., Cox, The Influence of Mr. Justice Murphy on Labor Law, 48 MICH. L.
REV. 767, 774-82, 787-93 (1950) (Court should distinguish between "signal picketing," which relies
for its impact on extrinsic economic sanctions against listeners, and "publicity picketing," which relies
on message); Gregory, supra note 12, at 198 (all picketing coerces business); Jones, supra note 3, at
1050-52 (picketing is not coercion but communication that may cause economic loss for picketed
business).
42. A. Cox, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 44-45 (1980).
43. The question was expressly avoided in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377
U.S. 58, 63 (1964). See supra note 38.
44. The entire constitutional analysis in Safeco reads as follows:
The Court of Appeals suggested that application of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to the picketing in this
case might violate the First Amendment. We think not. Although the Court recognized in Tree
Fruits that the Constitution might not permit "a broad ban against peaceful picketing," the
Court left no doubt that Congress may prohibit secondary picketing calculated "to persuade
the customers of the secondary employer to cease trading with him in order to force him to
cease dealing with, or to put pressure upon, the primary employer." Such picketing spreads
labor discord by coercing a neutral party to join the fray.. . . [T]his Court [has] expressly
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It is thus evident from Safeco and previous decisions establishing the
illegal objective doctrine that the First Amendment is no longer a serious
hurdle to restrictions on labor picketing. Without overruling or even men-
tioning Thornhill, the Court has treated labor picketing, even when unac-
companied by coercive conduct, as a purely economic activity.
B. Non-Labor Picketing: The Emergence of the Public Issue/Labor
Distinction
In the past twenty years, non-labor picketing has received full First
Amendment protection from content-based restrictions."' Until very re-
cently, however, it was not altogether clear whether this protection would
extend to picketing in support of an economic boycott." A unanimous
Court supplied the answer in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,47 rul-
ing that peaceful picketing by civil rights groups in support of a boycott of
white merchants was fully protected by the First Amendment, and could
not be the basis for tort liability.4" That decision was a ringing confirma-
held that a prohibition on "picketing in furtherance of [such] unlawful objectives" did not
offend the First Amendment. We perceive no reason to depart from that well-established un-
derstanding. As applied to picketing that predictably encourages consumers to boycott a secon-
dary business, § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) imposes no impermissible restrictions upon constitutionally pro-
tected speech.
447 U.S. at 616 (citations omitted).
45. See, eg., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466-67 (1980) (ordinance prohibiting all but labor
picketing unconstitutional); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (anti-picketing ordi-
nance with labor exception violates equal protection clause and First Amendment); Shuttlesworth v.
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 155 (1969) (ordinance requiring license to march or picket violates First
Amendment); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (peaceful mass picketing is exer-
cise of basic First Amendment right). See generally Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First
Amendment, 43 U. CHi. L. REV. 20, 29-35 (1975) (importance of content neutrality to First Amend-
ment doctrine).
46. One early Supreme Court case, Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950), suggested
that non-labor picketing in support of an economic boycott, in this case by a Black citizens group
demanding proportional hiring, would be treated no differently than labor picketing and would be
subject to the deferential illegal objective test. But later cases involving civil rights picketing estab-
lished a higher level of protection that has been applied by the Fifth Circuit in cases involving eco-
nomic boycotts. See, e.g., Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 595 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1979) (enjoining on First
Amendment grounds broad state court injunction against all picketing in support of civil rights boy-
cott); Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969) (injunction against all activity in support of
civil rights boycott, including peaceful picketing, overbroad in violation of First Amendment); Kelly v.
Page, 335 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1964) (peaceful civil rights picketing in support of boycott protected by
First Amendment). Cf State of Missouri v. National Org. of Women, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980)
(NOW's boycott of state businesses to achieve passage of Equal Rights Amendment protected under
First Amendment and not proscribed by Sherman Act). See generally Note, supra note 4 (peaceful
activity, including picketing, in support of politically motivated economic boycott should be protected
by First Amendment).
47. 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982).
48. The decision represents the culmination of more than 12 years of litigation over the boycott.
Id. at 3413-14. The aims of the boycott were both "primary"-urging merchants to employ black
clerks and cashiers-and "secondary"-putting pressure on the merchants to influence political deci-
sions. Id. at 3418. The means used in support of the boycott were primarily peaceful, including
marches, pickets, and speeches, id. at 3420, but several violent incidents occurred, id. at 3421-22.
947
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 91: 938, 1982
tion that non-labor picketing, unlike labor picketing, is subject only to
reasonable content-neutral restrictions,49 and is otherwise fully protected
as an exercise of free speech.
The Court distinguished cases upholding restrictions on secondary boy-
cotts and picketing by labor unions as involving "Congress' striking of the
delicate balance between union freedom of expression and the ability of
neutral employers, employees, and consumers to remain free from coerced
participation in industrial strife."5 0 The NAACP boycott, in contrast, in-
volved "expression on public issues [, which] has always rested on the
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.""1
The distinction between "public issue" picketing and labor picketing
was first articulated in Carey v. Brown, 2 decided on the same day as
Safeco. Carey struck down a residential picketing ordinance that prohib-
ited all but labor picketing as a violation of the equal protection clause
and the First Amendment because it discriminated between messages on
the basis of their content.5 3 This same content-based distinction has now
The state trial court held 130 individual defendants and the national NAACP liable for over $1.25
million in damages. Id. at 3414-16. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed portions of the judgment
and remanded for reduction of damages, id. at 3416-17, but upheld the imposition of liability for most
defendants, including the NAACP, on the theory that all defendants had agreed to use force, violence,
and threats in support of the boycott, and that the entire boycott was therefore illegal. Id. at 3416.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding all peaceful activity in support of the boycott,
including threats of social ostracism and other "coercive" social pressure, to be protected by the First
Amendment. Id. at 3427. Only losses clearly shown to be a proximate result of unlawful conduct
could be recovered. Id. at 3429.
49. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (statute prohibiting noisy and
disruptive demonstrations near school valid); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968) (law that
prohibits pickets from obstructing doors to courthouse valid); see also Smith v. Grady, 411 F.2d 181
(5th Cir. 1969) (injunction restricting number and conduct of pickets reasonable under circumstances,
except for requirement of silence).
50. 102 S. Ct. at 3425-26 (quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607,
617-18 (1980) (Blackman, J., concurring)). The Court elaborated no further on how this deference to
congressional policy could be justified under the First Amendment.
51. 102 S. Ct. at 3426 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)). Although "a major
purpose of the boycott was to influence governmental action," 102 S. Ct. at 3426, the Court does not
rely wholly on this fact in characterizing the boycott as concerning public issues. Many cases cited in
support of the First Amendment analysis do not concern attempts to influence government action, but
reflect a broader conception of "public issues." See, e.g., id. at 3424 (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88 (1940) and Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (attempt to
persuade real estate broker to stop "blockbusting" tactics)); id. at 3425 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516 (1945) (soliciting union membership)). The Court also referred explicitly to dissatisfaction
with business policy and to economic change. Id. at 3424-26, 3429, 3237. This broader definition of
"public issue" is more consistent with First Amendment doctrine than a definition restricted to electo-
ral politics. See infra note 92.
52. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
53. Id. at 471. The statute in Carey was subjected to strict scrutiny under the equal protection
clause because it impinged on the fundamental First Amendment right of freedom of speech on the
basis of a classification. Id. at 460-63. Because discrimination on the basis of content is strictly scruti-
nized under the First Amendment itself, see Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 530, 540 (1980), precisely the same test would have been applied even without the invocation of
the equal protection clause.
The Court introduced the public issue/labor picketing distinction in the following passage:
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been fully incorporated into the Supreme Court's own doctrine: labor
picketing is not considered "public issue picketing" and, on the basis of its
content, may be regulated much more freely.
C. Commercial Speech: First Amendment Protection of Economic
Competition
The constitutional status of commercial advertising has risen as that of
labor picketing has declined. Shortly after Thornhill, the Court declared
in Valentine v. Chrestensen4 that the First Amendment "poses no . ..
restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.""5 The
right to advertise was regarded as coextensive with the right to pursue a
gainful occupation, 6 and, in accordance with the Court's newly-learned
deference in matters of economic and social policy, 7 within the legisla-
ture's regulatory prerogative." In the last decade, however, the Court has
rejected the doctrine announced in Valentine and extended substantial
First Amendment protection to advertising, 9 although the precise consti-
tutional standard to be applied in commercial speech cases was clarified
only recently.
On the same day that it first articulated the distinction between labor
and "public issue" picketing in Carey, and illustrated its devastating con-
sequences for consumer picketing by labor unions in Safeco, the Court
announced, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commis-
The central difficulty [with the state's argument that labor protests merit special protection] is
that it forthrightly presupposes that labor picketing is more deserving of First Amendment
protection than are public protests over other issues, particularly the important economic, so-
cial, and political subjects about which these appellees wish to demonstrate. We reject that
proposition. Cf. T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 444-449 (1970) (sug-
gesting that non-labor picketing is more akin to pure expression than labor picketing and thus
should be subject to fewer restrictions).
447 U.S. at 466. Though making this distinction, Emerson argues for full protection of consumer
picketing like that in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964). See T.
EMERSON, supra note 7, at 444-49. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Local 1001 flies in the face of
Emerson's analysis.
54. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
55. Id. at 54. Accord Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
56. 316 U.S. at 54.
57. See supra p. 940.
58. 316 U.S. at 54.
59. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976) (ban on price advertising by pharmacists violates First Amendment); Bigelow v. Virginia,
421 U.S. 809 (1975) (ban on advertising of abortion referral service violates First Amendment). For
scholarly commentary on the developing First Amendment protection of commercial speech, see Baker,
Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1976) (commercial
speech should not be protected by First Amendment); Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amend-
ment Theory, 74 NW. U.L. REV. 372 (1979) (Court has applied lower standard where state interest
related to contractual rather than informational aspect of advertising); Jackson & Jeffries, Commer-
cial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979) (protection of
commercial speech reminiscent of Lochner).
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sion,6 ° the constitutional standard by which restrictions on commercial ad-
vertising would be judged. Because commercial advertising is regarded as
a particularly hardy form of speech, not easily "chilled," 6' limited regula-
tion of its content remains permissible. Regulation of deceptive advertising
or advertising related to an illegal commercial activity thus does not offend
the First Amendment. 62 But truthful advertising of legal commercial activ-
ity may be regulated only if the regulation is no broader than necessary to
promote directly a substantial state interest. 3 In a decision notable for its
detailed scrutiny of legislative ends and means, the Court applied this test
and struck down as unnecessarily broad a ban on purely promotional ad-
vertising by a public utility, even though the ban was found to promote
directly the state's substantial interest in encouraging conservation of
energy.6"
This analysis affords substantial First Amendment protection to eco-
nomic competition through advertising. Only the uncertain difference be-
tween "substantial" and "compelling" now distinguishes the First
Amendment standard for most commercial advertising from the First
Amendment standard for explicitly political speech." Central Hudson, to-
gether with Safeco, thus heralded the reversal of the constitutional priori-
ties established in Thornhill and Valentine-. commercial advertising, al-
though not fully protected, is more protected than peaceful labor
picketing."
II. First Amendment Protection for Consumer Picketing: Restoring
Constitutional Priorities
Despite the Court's decision in Safeco and the public issue/labor dis-
tinction made in Claiborne Hardware and Carey, the premises of Thorn-
60. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
61. Id. at 564 n.6.
6Z'. Id. at 563-64. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13, 15-16 (1979) (advertising more likely
to mislead than inform is unprotected); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rela-
tions, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973) (sex-segregated "help wanted" ads are related to sex discrimination in
employment and may be prohibited).
This latter exception is not analogous to the illegal objective test applied to labor picketing. Under
that test, the ban struck down in Central Hudson would presumably have been upheld because the
state had declared the promotion of energy consumption by means of advertising to be against public
policy. Cf. supra pp. 943-44 (circularity of illegal objective test).
63. 447 U.S. at 566.
64. Id. at 568-69.
65. See id. at 591 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Indeed, it is not clear that there is any difference
between a "compelling" and a "substantial" state interest. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 376-77 (1968) ("To characterize the quality of the government interest which must appear, the
Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial . . .")
66. The Central Hudson test explicitly weighs both the importance of the government interest,
447 U.S. at 568-69, and the tightness of "fit" between means and ends, id. at 570-71. Neither inquiry
is performed under the illegal objective test. See supra p. 943.
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hill remain valid: peaceful labor picketing continues to be an important
means of communication concerning matters of public concern. Restric-
tions on labor picketing therefore should be subject to strict First Amend-
ment scrutiny.
A. Labor Picketing as a Means of Communication
Since peaceful consumer picketing entails communication,67 its regula-
tion by government should be subjected to a careful First Amendment
analysis.68 Under current Supreme Court doctrine, any regulation of ex-
pressive activity based either directly on the content of the message com-
municated by the activity, or on the possible reaction of the listeners to
that content,69 is subject to rigorous scrutiny. The regulation may stand
only if the speech falls into one of the narrow categories of unprotected
speech,7" or if the regulation is a narrowly drawn means of achieving a
67. Although the Court has applied the deferential illegal objective test, which affords no more
than due process protection to labor picketing, it continues to acknowledge that labor picketing does
involve a significant element of communication. See NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct.
3409, 3425 (1982).
68. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). O'Brien was convicted for burn-
ing his draft registration card. Although the Court upheld his conviction, it took O'Brien's First
Amendment claim seriously enough to articulate a four-part test under which such claims of commu-
nicative intent could be judged. See id. at 376-77. The claim that labor picketing is protected expres-
sion should hardly be given less scrutiny than O'Brien's claim.
The analysis put forward in this section draws heavily upon that advanced by John Hart Ely as
exemplified in his article, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balanc-
ing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975). Ely attempts to articulate the theory behind recent Supreme
Court cases involving expression mixed with action or symbolic speech. Those cases include Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (conviction for wearing jacket with slogan "Fuck the Draft" violates
First Amendment); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(suspension of students for wearing black armbands in war protest violates First Amendment); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (conviction for draft card burning not barred by First Amend-
ment). Ely finds the key to the Court's seemingly divergent decisions in O'Brien's requirement that
the government interest asserted in support of regulation of such activity must be unrelated to the
suppression of free expression. See 391 U.S. at 367-77. Thus, if the government interest remains even
if no message is received by the listeners, the relatively deferential O'Brien test applies. But if the
government interest is related to the content of the message and the listeners' possible reaction to that
message, a much stricter level of scrutiny applies. Ely, supra, at 1496-98. This distinction between
content-based and content-neutral regulations of expressive activity has become much more explicit in
more recent cases such as Carey v.'Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980), and Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92 (1972).
69. "If the First Amendment means anything, it means that, absent clear and present danger,
government has no power to restrict expression because of the effect its message is likely to have on
the public." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 575 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., concurring). See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 769-70 (1976) (First Amendment violated by ban on price advertising moti-
vated by consumers' expected reaction to information); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23-24
(1971) (state may not punish wearing of slogan "Fuck the Draft" based on fear of audience reaction);
Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969) (school may not prohibit black
armbands based on fear of disruption, or controversy caused by message); cases cited at supra note 17.
See generally Ely, supra note 68, at 1496-1502.
70. Courts can determine whether a species of speech is within the scope of the First Amendment
only by examining its content. Speech falling into one of several narrow categories is subject to whole-
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compelling state interest.71 If the regulation is unrelated to content, it will
stand unless the incidental restriction of freedom of expression is greater
than necessary to advance the state's interest.
72
The illegal objective test, under which all labor picketing can be exten-
sively regulated, is apparently based not on the picket's message, but on
the assumption that it is inherently coercive.7 This assumption has been
made without drawing the crucial distinction between the economic coer-
cion of the picketed business that may result if the listeners are persuaded
by the message, 74 and the coercion of the listeners themselves. 7s A regula-
tion based merely on the coercion of the picketed business that may result
from the uncoerced response of listeners to the picket's message is pre-
cisely the kind of content-based restriction that should receive exacting
First Amendment scrutiny under current doctrine. On the other hand,
regulation of aspects of labor picketing that coerce the listener and thereby
induce a response irrespective of the picket's message should be subject
only to the more permissive standards for incidental restrictions on
expression.
Certainly consumer picketing can coerce the listener. Violence, serious
physical threats, obstruction of entryways, and similar behavior that may
sometimes be associated with picketing cannot claim First Amendment
protection. 76 But much consumer picketing, like that at issue in Safeco, is
sale restriction. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 538 n.5
(1980); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (libel); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words).
The Court's analysis has begun to break down at the margins, however. Thus, while conceding that
"indecent speech" is within the scope of the First Amendment, a plurality of the Court led by Justice
Stevens has accorded it a lower level of First Amendment protection from content-based restriction.
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746-47 (1978) (opinion of Stevens, J.); see also infra p.
954. In addition, commercial speech, previously one of the categories of unprotected speech, has been
brought within the scope of the First Amendment at an intermediate level of protection. See supra pp.
949-50. See generally A. COX, supra note 42 (noting deterioration of two-tier First Amendment
doctrine).
71. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980); infra note
111.
72. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1969); see also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949) (ordinance prohibiting sound amplifiers that emit "loud and raucous" noise upheld); supra
note 49 (content-neutral regulations of picketing permissible). Ely has called the O'Brien standard
"no gratuitous inhibition," and has pointed out that the standard is a weak one, offering little protec-
tion to expressive conduct. Ely, supra note 68, at 1488; cf T. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 83-86
("O'Brien is a serious setback for First Amendment theory.") Critics of the Court's two track analysis
have focused on the weakness of the protections against content-neutral regulations of expressive activ-
ity. See Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 473-74
(1980); Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981).
73. See supra pp. 945-46 (analyzing origin of illegal objective test).
74. See supra p. 941; supra note 31 (economic impact irrelevant to First Amendment status of
picketing).
75. See supra note 41 (coercion of listeners as legitimate basis for regulation).
76. On the other hand, "the right to picket itself [cannot] be taken away merely because there
may have been isolated incidents of abuse falling far short of violence occurring in the course of that
picketing." Cafeteria Employees Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 296 (1943); see also Machesky
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wholly peaceful.
It might be argued that all picketing, no matter how peaceful, is inher-
ently coercive of the listener and induces action irrespective of the content
of its message." But Claiborne Hardware wholly undermines this argu-
ment: if the response to a peaceful picket were truly unrelated to the con-
tent of the picket's message, all picketing, or at least all picketing in front
of a business establishment, should be subject to regulation on the same
terms as labor picketing. Non-labor picketing, however, receives full First
Amendment protection from content-based regulation."8 There is no rea-
son why the standards developed in the non-labor context to identify and
protect peaceful picketing" would not be equally manageable in the con-
text of consumer picketing by labor unions. Consumer picketing, like non-
labor picketing, should be subject only to reasonable content-neutral
restrictions.
Justice Stevens, the author of the Court's opinion in Claiborne Hard-
ware, suggested in his concurrence in Safeco, however, that in the labor
context there is a more subtle mechanism of coercion by which even
peaceful consumer picketing induces a response independent of the mes-
sage conveyed."0 The characterization of labor picketing as a signal not
entitled to First Amendment protection implies that the union message,
perhaps because it triggers class loyalties,' does not attain the level of
rational discussion more deserving of First Amendment protection in the
view of some theorists.8 2 Yet the logic of this suggestion, to the extent that
it is any more than a bare expression of class bias, would require dimin-
ished First Amendment protection for appeals to deeply ingrained beliefs
v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (1969) (injunction that forbids peaceful picketing as well as abuses is over-
broad and violates First Amendment). Similarly, in a civil action for damages, the recovery by the
picketed business should be limited to the damages that it can demonstrate are the proximate result of
specific incidents of coercive conduct, not of the peaceful inducement of listeners not to patronize the
business. Cf NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3437 (1982) (incidents of violence
do not taint entire civil rights boycott; "A court must be wary of a claim that the true color of a forest
is better revealed by reptiles hidden in the weeds than by the foliage of countless free-standing trees.")
77. See supra note 41.
78. See supra pp. 947-49.
79. See supra note 49 (content-neutral regulations of picketing permitted).
80. 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980).
81. C Jaffe, supra note 19, at 1037-44 (picketing is expression that appeals to class solidarity
and vaguer humanitarian impulses, and as such is communication).
82. Over forty years ago, the Court recognized that "[pleaceful picketing is the workingman's
means of communication." Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287,
293 (1941) (peaceful picketing in "context of violence" unprotected). But it simultaneously expressed
a preference for rational discussion as the paradigm of protected speech: "It must never be forgotten,
however, that the Bill of Rights was the child of the Enlightenment. Back of the guarantee of free
speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the
mind." Id. This emphasis on reasoned discussion, like Stevens' conception of a "signal," fails to recog-
nize that "the nearer an idea is to acceptance, the less likely is abstract ratiocination to be the control-
ling factor." Jaffe, supra note 19, at 1038.
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of any kind. Most political speech, including the picketing in Claiborne
Hardware, would be vulnerable to such an attack."'
The mere activity of picketing in front of a business establishment often
communicates its own message: Support us by not supporting the business
with which we have a dispute. But the meaning of the picketing activity is
elaborated by the content of the picket signs and often by accompanying
leaflets. Assuming that the message is not communicated by physical
threats or other coercive conduct, the listener's response depends upon a
free decision whether or not to support the objectives of the picketing
group.8" If, as Justice Stevens appears to contend, the listeners' response to
a picket is different when the subject is labor, that response is determined
by the picket's expressive and informational content.
By prohibiting peaceful consumer picketing only when the subject is a
labor dispute, the government has engaged in the regulation of expression
based on its content.8" This Justice Stevens admits.86 For him, and for the
minority of the Court that adheres to his novel view that regulation of
content is often permitted under the First Amendment, 7 this admission is
not crucial. But according to the view of the First Amendment still held
by the majority, content-based restrictions of expressive activity in a public
forum should trigger the strictest First Amendment scrutiny.8
B. Labor Picketing as Public Issue Picketing
Perhaps recognizing that the extension of First Amendment protection
to non-labor picketing undermines the existing rationale for permitting
wholesale regulation of labor picketing, the Court appears to have adopted
a new rationale founded on the openly content-based distinction between
"public issue" picketing and labor picketing.8 ' According to this rationale,
83. See A. COX, supra note 42, at 47 (most political speech contains appeals to automatic
responses).
84. A particular listener may be expected to respond differently to the messages of different pick-
ets. For example, a moviegoer who would be indifferent or antagonistic to a union picket by striking
employees of a movie theater may choose to honor a picket by a fundamentalist religious group of a
movie depicting adultery in a positive light, or a picket by members of the John Birch Society of a
movie starring an alleged Communist.
85. The distinction between labor and non-labor picketing is unquestionably based on content.
See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980).
86. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 618 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
87. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746-47 (1978) (indecent speech subject to
content regulation); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (non-obscene
"adult movies" subject to content regulation).
88. See supra pp. 951-52.
89. The suggestion that labor picketing does not concern a public issue and is therefore not enti-
tled to First Amendment protection, see supra pp. 947-48, strikes at the heart of Thornhill, see supra
p. 941. The Supreme Court recently applied this distinction in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
102 S. Ct. 3409, 3425-26 (1982), to distinguish restrictions on labor picketing from restrictions on
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a union picket publicizing the anti-union practices of an employer does
not concern a public issue, whereas a non-union picket publicizing the
racially discriminatory practices of the same employer does. Only the non-
labor picket is entitled to First Amendment protection.
But a labor dispute, like a charge of race discrimination, is clearly of
interest to members of the public not directly involved.9" Indeed, the suc-
cess of the union's consumer picket depends upon public interest and sup-
port; absent the potential for such interest, there would be no need for
restrictions. Just as the race discrimination of a single business reflects the
broader phenomenon of racism and the problems of black citizens in a
predominantly white society, a single labor dispute reflects the position of
workers in an economic system based on private ownership and control of
production. Each picket appeals to public solidarity with the picketing
group in its particular dispute and in its larger struggle."' Neither the
labor dispute nor the discrimination charge is directly subject to electoral
resolution, ' although each lies within the realm of governmental action.93
picketing in support of a civil rights boycott.
90. As one commentator has observed:
Decisions on what is to be produced in the system . . . [J on the allocation of resources to
different lines of production, on the allocation of the labor force to different occupations and
workplaces, on plant location, the technologies to be used in production, the quality of goods
and services, innovation of new products . . . are of momentous consequences for the welfare
of any society. . . . The delegation of these decisions to the businessman does not diminish
their importance or, considering their consequences, their public aspect.
C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 171 (1977).
Lindblom outlines some of the ways in which the business community removes from the political
agenda the "grand issues of politico-economic organization: private enterprise, a high degree of corpo-
rate autonomy, protection of the status quo on distribution of income and wealth, close consultation
between business and government, and restriction of union demands to those consistent with business
profitability, among others." Id. at 205. The Supreme Court's exclusion of labor picketing from the
scope of protection afforded "public issue" picketing serves these same ends.
91. Cf Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1940) (each labor dispute is part of larger
social movement). The Court relied on this aspect of the Thornhill decision in its extension of First
Amendment protection to commercial advertising in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council:
We know of no requirement that, in order to avail themselves of First Amendment protection,
the parties to a labor dispute need address themselves to the merits of unionism in general or
to any subject beyond their immediate dispute. It was observed in Thornhill that "the practices
in a single factory may have economic repercussions upon a whole region and affect wide-
spread systems of marketing." Since the fate of such a "single factory" could as well turn on its
ability to advertise its product as on the resolution of its labor difficulties, we see no satisfac-
tory distinction between the two kinds of speech.
425 U.S. 748, 762-63 (1976) (citations omitted).
92. If the labor/public issue distinction rested on the relation of the subject matter to electoral
politics, it might draw support from those scholars who would limit the scope of First Amendment
protections to speech that directly concerns government policy. See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971). But this very narrow view of the First
Amendment has never been endorsed by the Supreme Court. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431
U.S. 209, 231-32 (1977). Other proponents of the theory that the First Amendment protects speech
that contributes to democratic self-government define the scope of such speech much more broadly. See
Meikeljohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 255-57.
93. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976) (equal employment
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The Court's conception of a public issue may be an historical one. The
declaration in Thornhill that the facts of a labor dispute are of public
concern occurred at a time of intense public discussion and corresponding
legislative activity concerning the rights of employees and the role of un-
ions.94 The intensity of this debate has subsided considerably, while the
civil rights movement has generated a comparable level of public contro-
versy and legislative activity in more recent times. But if it is this observa-
tion that lies behind the public issue/labor dispute distinction, the impli-
cations for political freedom are ominous. The decline of public
controversy surrounding an issue should not be a rationale for denying to
concerned groups First Amendment protection of the means of communi-
cation by which they might rekindle public controversy and stimulate a
new period of reform.
It is perhaps not merely the decline of public controversy but the char-
acter of the resulting legislation that explains the transformation of the
labor dispute from a public to a private issue in the eyes of the Court. In
1940, the Thornhill Court was forced to acknowledge that the employ-
ment relationship, previously regarded as a private contractual relation-
ship between the individual worker and the employer," had long become
not only a source of economic upheaval but also a matter of great public
concern. Congress responded to that upheaval and public concern by at-
tempting, through the NLRA, to contain and institutionalize labor-man-
agement disputes.96 The NLRA, as it has evolved over the years, attempts
in many ways to reestablish in collective form the private nature of the
employment relationship. The NLRA has been characterized as a quid
pro quo:9 7 labor was granted the right to organize and to bargain collec-
tively over a limited range of subjects governing the employer-employee
relationship;98 in turn, its ability to cause more widespread economic dis-
opportunity); NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976) (regulation of labor-management relations).
94. See generally I. BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS 768-95 (1970) (summarizing turbulent his-
tory of labor movement from 1933-41).
95. See Sayre, Labor and the Courts, 39 YALE L.J. 682, 684-95 (1930) (collective activity by
workers regarded initially as illegal conspiracy); see also E. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note
8, at 4 (conspiracy and restraint of trade used as convenient grab bag terms to render group activity
illegal).
96. See generally Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509
(1981) (labor law has removed labor disputes from public sphere to private dispute-resolution
mechanisms).
97. This "quid pro quo" characterizes both the typical collective bargaining agreement, in which
the union exchanges a no-strike promise for the employer's agreement to arbitrate grievances, id. at
1528, and the system of labor relations as a whole, which offers to unions certain legal protections in
exchange for the surrender of many of their economic weapons, id. at 1546. The "quid pro quo" is
not an equal exchange. See Lynd, Investment Decisions and the Quid Pro Quo Myth, 29 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 396 (1979) (employer's duty to bargain narrower in scope than union's no-strike
promise).
98. Only subjects not lying "at the core of entrepreneurial control" are subject to the duty to
bargain. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J., concur-
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location was greatly circumscribed."
Among the major limitations on labor is the prohibition of secondary
pressures. Several provisions of the NLRA prohibit a union from broad-
ening the impact of a labor dispute by urging the involvement of the em-
ployees or customers of an employer not directly involved in the dispute. °10
These prohibitions encompass, as this Note has demonstrated, various
forms of non-coercive communication to consumers.
The Court's distinction between labor and public issue picketing ac-
commodates the congressional labor policy of confining labor disputes to
the parties themselves, without abrogating First Amendment protection of
non-labor picketing. At the same time, however, it introduces a dangerous
innovation into First Amendment doctrine. By establishing a principle of
constitutional adjudication that allows Congress to remove controversial
matters from public discussion without encountering the strictest judicial
scrutiny of the motivating state interest and the means of promoting that
interest, the Court's distinction seriously undermines the First
Amendment.'0 '
C. Commercial Advertising: An Incident of the Commercial Transaction
It has been suggested by one commentator that consumer picketing, like
advertising, is "economic speech" and should therefore also receive the
intermediate level of protection afforded by the Central Hudson test.' "
There is, however, a fundamental difference between the messages in-
volved. Speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is
a mere incident of that transaction and should arguably not be protected
by the First Amendment at all. ' The interest of the public and the ad-
ring). See also First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (decision to close part
of business not mandatory subject of bargaining). See generally Lynd, supra note 97 (employer's duty
to bargain narrow in scope).
99. See Lynd, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activity After Union Recognition: A Study of
Legislative History, 50 IND. L.J. 720, 720-30 (1975) (union recognition limits workers' right to use
economic pressures).
100. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976) (secondary boycotts and sympathy strikes prohibited); id. §
158(e) ("hot cargo clause," under which employer agrees not to handle non-union goods, prohibited).
101. There is, for example, no apparent reason why the Court could not, by the same principle,
defer to a congressional decision that employment discrimination is also a private matter between
employers and minority employees, under the supervision of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.
102. See A. COX, supra note 42, at 47-48.
103. This argument has been developed fully in Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 59. Justice Rehn-
quist, the sole dissenter from the decisions protecting commercial speech, has taken a similar position.
See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 588-99 (1980);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 781-90 (1980).
Justice Rehnquist, however, is not very solicitous of freedom of expression in general, and particularly
not in the labor context. See Lind, Justice Rehnquist: First Amendment Speech in the Labor Context,
8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93 (1980).
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vertiser in "the free flow of commercial information"104 through promo-
tional advertising is no different from their interest in the free flow of
goods and services, which has, since the decline of the Lochner era, been
deemed an appropriate object of regulation. Indeed, the Court's articu-
lated rationale for protecting commercial speech rests in large part on the
important function of advertising in the free enterprise system' and not
on its relation, dubious at best, to the philosophical foundations of the
First Amendment."°6
Unlike other categories of speech seemingly unrelated to the philosophi-
cal values underlying the First Amendment, commercial advertising is
readily identifiable; its definition has never involved the intractable
problems the Court has encountered, for instance, in its obscenity doc-
trine.107 Although line drawing is never an easy task, the line between
commercial advertising and protected speech would seem to pose no signif-
icant threat to First Amendment freedoms. 08 Indeed, the Court itself has
conceded that the extension of full First Amendment protection to adver-
tising could weaken protection for other forms of speech." 9 In spite of
these considerations, however, the First Amendment has been invoked to
protect an incident of economic liberty."10 By contrast, consumer picketing
appeals inherently to policical, ideological, or class sympathies. The union
picket aims to persuade the consumer to forego, in the interest of solidar-
ity with the union's admittedly economic aims, whatever economic benefit
drew her to the business or product. Therefore, unlike mere commercial
advertising, consumer picketing is an exercise of political freedom that im-
plicates the very core of First Amendment protection. This difference calls
104. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976).
105.
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our re-
sources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a
matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well-in-
formed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.
Id. at 765. See generally Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 59, at 25-40 (commercial speech doctrine
protects economic liberty).
106. See Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 59, at 14-25; see also Baker, supra note 59.
107. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 79-80 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[W]e have been unable to provide 'sensitive tools' to separate obscenity from other sexually oriented
but constitutionally protected speech, so that efforts to suppress the former do not spill over into the
suppression of the latter.")
108. See Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 59, at 25 ("Both reason and experience suggest that the
distinction between commercial speech and protected speech is relatively easy to maintain.")
109. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) ("To require a parity of
constitutional protection for commercial and non-commercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply
by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of
speech.")
110. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 588-99 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting); see also Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 59, at 25-40.
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for a return to the priorities established in Thornhill and Valentine.
III. The Incorporation of Substantive Economic Values into First
Amendment Doctrine
When reviewing a restriction on peaceful communication concerning
matters of public interest in a public forum, the Court's strong reluctance
to approve content-based restrictions on speech becomes a virtually insur-
mountable barrier.' 1 It is this barrier that the Court circumvents by treat-
ing all labor picketing directed at consumers only as economic activity not
entitled to First Amendment protection. The Court's cursory approval of
the NLRA prohibition of secondary consumer picketing in Safeco implic-
itly held that the state interest in preventing the economic coercion of neu-
tral employers justifies any resulting restriction of expressive activity."
2
Iil.
Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not
prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say. Selective
exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by
reference to content alone.
Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). See also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462-63
(1980); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976).
As the uncompromising language in Mosley suggests, the exceptions to the prohibition of content-
based restrictions are exceedingly rare. The Court's special solicitude for the integrity of the judicial
process led it to uphold a prohibition on picketing in front of a courthouse where the picketing was
related to a matter being considered by the court. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965). In
addition, subject matter restrictions, which are, of course, based on content, have survived on rare
occasions. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (government may prohibit partisan political
speech on military base); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (opinion of Black-
mun, J.) (plurality allowed city transit system to refuse to accept partisan political advertising al-
though it accepted commercial advertising). The Court, however, has recently placed these cases in
perspective: "Greer and Lehman properly are viewed as narrow exceptions to the general prohibition
against subject matter distinctions." Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,
539 (1980). In both cases the public facility to which access was sought was not an open forum such
as the streets and sidewalks on which picketing takes place.
112. See supra pp. 944-46. The policy behind the NLRA prohibition of secondary consumer
picketing, NLRA § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), has two facets: the state interest in regulating commerce and the
state interest in protecting individual private businesses from this kind of economic harm. These two
facets are expressed in a single sentence in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Local 1001: "[Secon-
dary] picketing spreads labor discord by coercing a neutral party to join the fray." 447 U.S. 607, 616
(1980). Indeed, these two facets are only two ways of viewing the same state interest. Congress'
exercise of its commerce power in this provision reflects the policy judgment that the protection of
individual businesses from the economic harm that may result from the peaceful publicizing of a labor
dispute is in the best interest of the economy. It is not surprising that the health of the whole economy
is identified with the health of the business community rather than that of the labor community. See
generally C. LINDBLOM, supra note 90, at 170-213 (public policy substantially shaped by need to
create favorable business climate).
That the predominant concern of Congress was to protect private business interests from economic
harm is evident in the language of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(b), in its legislative history, see NLRB v. Fruit &
Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 63-71, 82-92 (1964) (summarizing legislative history:
statements by those who favored restriction reflect overriding concern with "fairness" to "neutral"
employers; no mention is made of aggregate effects of such picketing on national commerce), and in
Congress' reliance on private enforcement, see 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1976) (upon application to
NLRB, employer may obtain injunction against secondary pressures, including picketing); Labor-
Management Relations Act § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976) (employer who incurs loss as result of
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That holding effectively raised to preeminent constitutional status the
right of a business to carry on its affairs without interference from appeals
for public support in labor disputes.
The Court's unwarranted deference to restrictions on labor picketing
stands in stark contrast to its exacting First Amendment scrutiny of re-
strictions on commercial advertising. These commercial speech decisions,
like the substantive due process decisions of the Lochner era, elevate pri-
vate economic interests to the status of constitutional rights.1"' This juxta-
position of First Amendment judicial restraint and activism" 4 appears
contradictory, however, only if legal form is allowed to obscure political
substance. Deference to restrictions on labor picketing and activist protec-
tion of commercial advertising are both consistent with a substantive eco-
nomic ideology of free enterprise similar to that which animated the Court
in the Lochner era.
Both a union picket and a commercial advertisement are intended to
influence consumers' choices among goods and services. To the extent that
each is successful, some business, either the business picketed by the union
or the advertiser's competitor, will suffer a corresponding economic loss.
But advertising influences these consumer choices and inflicts economic
loss in a manner that promotes the system of economic competition,
whereas the union picket influences consumer choices through appeals to
class loyalty and political sympathy that are inconsistent with economic
competition.
These same distinctions were drawn under the common-law doctrine of
interference with business relations. Under this doctrine, elevated to con-
stitutional status by the Supreme Court in the Lochner era, union activity
that harmed a business was tortious and enjoinable, while "reasonable
competition," however harmful, was not. ' The labor picketing doctrine
represented by Safeco, together with the commercial speech doctrine rep-
resented by Central Hudson, reintroduces these economic values into the
Constitution.' 6 The Supreme Court has thus incorporated into First
Amendment doctrine a hierarchy of values that is more consistent with the
free enterprise system than with the system of freedom of expression.
secondary picketing may sue for damages in federal district court).
113. See supra pp. 957-58 (analogy between substantive due process and commercial speech
cases).
114. Cf A. COX, supra note 42, at 32-38 (noting doctrinal inconsistency between exacting scru-
tiny in commercial speech cases and deferential stance toward "indecent speech").
115. See supra p. 939.
116. Similarly, the consumer has a constitutionally cognizable right to the information conveyed
by an advertiser, see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 756-57, 763-64 (1976), but no acknowledged right or even interest in receiving the informa-
tion conveyed by a union picket, see supra pp. 943-44.
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The Speech or Debate Clause Protection
of Congressional Aides
The speech or debate clause of the Constitution provides that "for any
Speech or Debate in either House, they [Senators and Representatives]
shall not be questioned in any other Place."' The Supreme Court did not
have occasion to construe the clause until 1881. Then, in Kilbourn v.
Thompson,2 the Court held that the purpose of the clause, to protect the
independence of Members of Congress in the performance of their legisla-
tive responsibilities, 3 would be ill-served by a literal reading of the phrase
"Speech or Debate":
It would be a narrow view of the constitutional provision to limit it
to words spoken in debate. The reason of the rule is as forcible in its
application to written reports presented in that body by its commit-
tees, to resolutions offered, . . . and to the act of voting . . .. In
short, to things generally done in a session of the House by one of its
members in relation to the business before it.4
The small body of speech or debate case law built up after Kilbourn'
deals principally with whether particular activities not adverted to in Kil-
bourn fall within the set of legislative functions for which immunity is to
be conferred."
I. U.S. CON.ST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
2. 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
3. Id. at 203. In support of its broad view of the purpose of the clause, the Court cited an opinion
by Chief Justice Parsons of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, interpreting a similar provision in that
state's constitution. Parsons wrote:
These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of protecting the members against
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to support the rights of the people, by enabling their
representatives to execute the functions of their office without fear of prosecutions, civil or
criminal. I therefore think that the article ought not to be construed strictly, but liberally, that
the full design of it may be answered. I will not confine it to delivering an opinion, uttering a
speech, or haranguing in debate; but will extend it to the giving of a vote, to the making of a
written report, and to every other act resulting from the nature, and the execution, of the
office.
Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808).
4. 103 U.S. 168, 203 (1881) (emphasis added).
5. The clause has been addressed by the Supreme Court in only ten cases other than Kilbourn, all
but one of which were decided in the last fifteen years: Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979);
United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979); Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421
U.S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606
(1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969);
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966); Ten-
ney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
6. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967) (conduct of committee investigation);
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
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In 1972, the Court further extended the reach of the clause by holding,
in Gravel v. United States,7 that not only Senators and Representatives,
but also their aides, are entitled to invoke the protection of the clause
"insofar as the conduct of the latter would be a protected legislative act if
performed by the Member himself."' While the Court's extension of im-
munity to legislative aides seemed clear enough as applied to the facts in
Gravel, in other contexts it has raised two concerns.
The first is that the Court's opinion did not define who qualifies as an
aide for purposes of speech or debate clause protection. The Gravel case
involved a member of Senator Gravel's personal staff who, it is clear from
the record, worked closely with the Senator in preparation for the sub-
committee hearing that gave rise to the case.' There are, however, other
varieties of legislative branch employees who are not so closely bound to
individual Members of Congress; these include committee staff members,
employees of either House as a whole, and staff members of auxiliary
legislative entities, such as the General Accounting Office. The Gravel
decision left open the question of whether congressional employees who
are not closely bound to individual Members of Congress should be enti-
tled to share in the immunity established by the speech or debate clause.
The second concern generated by the Gravel holding is that it too indis-
criminately extends speech or debate protection to those aides who fall
within the class of persons eligible to invoke the privilege, however that
class may be defined. The Gravel decision permits aides to assert speech
or debate clause protection directly, subject only to a Member's veto, and
fails to require a nexus between a Member of Congress and the act for
which an aide seeks immunity. Thus, the extension of immunity effected
in Gravel is broader than it need be to safeguard the legislative indepen-
dence of Senators and Representatives themselves. Moreover, by affording
aides the opportunity to invoke immunity for acts they undertake on their
own accord, the Gravel holding invites abuse.
After analyzing the two concerns raised by Gravel, this Note proposes a
new standard for speech or debate protection, one that would incorporate
a functional definition of the term "aide." Under the proposed standard,
immunity would be available to aides only in circumstances in which the
independence of Members of Congress, as distinguished from the indepen-
dence of their aides, may be presumed to be implicated.
7. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
8. Id. at 618.
9. United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 937 (D. Mass. 1971).
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I. Speech or Debate Clause Interpretations Prior to Gravel: Intimations
of Limited Congressional Staff Immunity
In Kilbourn v. Thompson,10 the Supreme Court ruled that the speech
or debate clause protected Members of the House of Representatives from
liability for a resolution ordering the illegal arrest of the plaintiff," but
that damages could be assessed against the Sargeant-at-Arms of the
House, who had carried out the arrest.1 2 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court did not raise the possibility that a congressional staff member, such
as the Sargeant-at-Arms, might be eligible for some measure of speech or
debate immunity.
That possibility surfaced in the Court's next speech or debate clause
decision, some seventy years later in Tenney v. Brandhove. 3 After noting
that the defendants in Tenney were Members of Congress, the Court ob-
served: "Legislative privilege in such a case deserves greater respect than
where an official acting on behalf of a legislature is sued [as in Kilbourn]
or the legislature seeks the affirmative aid of the courts to assert a privi-
lege." Thus, the Court implied that it would accord some respect to the
assertion of speech or debate clause immunity by an official acting on be-
half of Congress.
The Court was more explicit about that prospect in Dombrowski v.
Eastland,'" although it again declined to extend immunity to a congres-
sional aide. Citing its dictum in Tenney, the Court declared that it had
"held . . .that this doctrine [of speech or debate immunity] is less abso-
lute, although applicable, when applied to officers or employees of a legis-
lative body, rather than to legislators themselves." 6 For the first time,
then, the Court explicitly took the position that congressional staff mem-
bers enjoyed some degree of speech or debate protection. The Court did
not explain, however, what a less-than-absolute immunity might amount
to or how its impact should be assessed in particular cases. Nor did the
Court set forth a rationale for the extension of immunity to aides.
Powell v. McCormack," the last of the Court's decisions prior to
Gravel to bear upon the issue of staff immunity, did little to clarify the
Court's position. Powell involved a challenge by Representative Powell
10. 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
11. Id. at 205.
12. Id. Kilbourn was eventually awarded a $20,000judgrnent against Thompson, the Sargeant-at-
Arms. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 11 D.C. (MacArth. & M.) 401, 432 (1883). Fortunately for
Thompson, Congress passed a special appropriation to pay the judgment. J. HAMILTON, THE POWER
TO PROBE: A STUDY OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 88 n.* (1977).
13. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
14. Id. at 378 (emphasis added).
15. 387 U.S. 82 (1967).
16. Id. at 85.
17. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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and some of his constituents to his exclusion by and from the House of
Representatives. The Court dismissed Powell's suit against Members of
the House, but ruled that his action could be maintained against the
House employees who implemented the resolution excluding Powell. 8
What was remarkable about the Court's discussion of the speech or debate
question in Powell was not what it concluded, but what it excluded: any
reference to the potential applicability of speech or debate clause immu-
nity to congressional aides. Indeed, despite its declaration to the contrary
in Dombrowski, the Court asserted categorically in Powell that
"[fireedom of legislative activity and the purposes of the Speech or Debate
Clause are fully protected if legislators are relieved of the burden of de-
fending themselves."' 9 The confusion was not resolved until the Court's
decision in Gravel.
II. An Assessment of the Gravel Standard
On the evening of June 29, 1971, Senator Mike Gravel convened a
meeting of the Senate Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Grounds, a
subcommittee he chaired. Gravel proceeded to read excerpts from a his-
tory of the Vietnam War that had been prepared by the Department of
Defense and classified as Top Secret-Sensitive. The Senator then placed
the entire forty-seven volume study, popularly referred to as the Pentagon
Papers, into the subcommittee record, making it accessible to the press
and, through the press, to the public.
Leonard Rodberg, who had been added to Gravel's personal staff on
the morning of June 29, had assisted the Senator in preparation for the
subcommittee meeting. Shortly thereafter, Rodberg was subpoenaed to tes-
tify before a federal grand jury that was investigating possible violations
of law in connection with the public release of the Pentagon Papers.
Rodberg moved to quash the subpoena, and Senator Gravel was permitted
to intervene on Rodberg's behalf in the district court proceeding. The Sen-
ator argued that requiring Rodberg to appear and testify before the grand
jury would trench on the legislative independence reserved to Gravel as a
Member of Congress by the speech or debate clause."0
Both the district court' and the court of appeals22 in the case held that
18. Id. at 506.
19. Id. at 505 (footnote omitted).
20. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 608-10 (1972).
21. United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930 (D. Mass. 1971). The district court held that neither
Rodberg nor other persons could be questioned by the grand jury regarding Gravel's conduct at, or in
preparation for, the subcommittee hearing. Id. at 938. They could, however, be questioned about
Gravel's endeavor to arrange for private publication of the Pentagon Papers, since that undertaking,
in the court's view, was not within the range of legislative activity protected by the clause. Id. at 936.
As to Rodberg's own actions, the court held that speech or debate clause immunity would be available
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Rodberg's activities at, and in preparation for, the subcommittee hearing
were protected by the speech or debate clause. The Supreme Court agreed
and, in so doing, broke in two respects from the pattern that had emerged
in its earlier decisions-first, by actually extending speech or debate im-
munity to a congressional aide, 3 and, second, by announcing a standard
for such extensions that, as the Court noted, involved a "refusal to distin-
guish between Senator and aide in applying the Speech or Debate
Clause.
'2
On the second point, if not the first, the Court also departed sharply
from the holdings by the district court and the court of appeals. Both of
these courts had required, as a prerequisite to the extension of immunity,
that a connection be demonstrated between Member and aide with respect
to the particular one of the aide's actions for which immunity was sought.
Under the standard set forth by the Supreme Court, no such linkage need
be established; any act that would be protected under the speech or debate
clause when performed by a Member of Congress is also to be protected
when performed by an aide.2 ' The Court made no mention of this essen-
tial difference between its holding and the holdings of the district court
and the court of appeals.
26
"to the extent that they were undertaken at the Senator's direction either at a meeting of the Subcom-
mittee on Public Buildings and Grounds or in preparation for and intimately related to said meeting."
Id. at 938. Rodberg's activities in connection with the subcommittee meeting were afforded protection
because they "would have been legislative acts, and therefore privileged, if performed by the Senator
personally." Id. at 937-38. As already indicated, the court did not consider efforts to secure broader
public dissemination of the Pentagon Papers as meeting this standard.
The court grounded its extension of immunity to Rodberg on its observation that Members of
Congress depend considerably for their effectiveness upon the services of confidential assistants. Id. at
937. It cited Dombrowski v. Eastland for the proposition that "employees have rights flowing from
the Speech or Debate Clause," id. at 937 n.7, but it emphasized that the privilege established by the
clause "belongs to Congressmen only and not to their assistants and aides," id. at 934.
22. United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753 (1st Cir. 1972). The court of appeals declared that the
need for legislators to be able to repose complete confidence in their personal aides required that a
Member and the Member's aide be "treated as one." Id. at 761. But this bold expression of
equivalency, which the Supreme Court was to adduce in its own opinion, Gravel v. United States, 408
U.S. 606, 616 (1972), overstated the lengths to which the court went in extending immunity to con-
gressional aides. In its next sentence, the court of appeals conceded that there might properly be some
exceptions to the suggested congruence. 455 F.2d at 761. The court then observed that the posited
"synonymity is founded upon the relationship, not on the fact of employment. Rodberg, for example,
is not protected from inquiry as to events unconnected with the intervenor at the time of occurrence."
Id. Thus, had Rodberg undertaken legislative acts on his own accord while in the employ of Gravel,
he would have been without the protection of the speech or debate clause for those acts. It seems
evident that the court intended that a Member and his aide be treated as a unit under the clause only
when they are actually functioning as a unit in carrying out particular legislative activities-as, for
instance, Gravel and Rodberg had functioned in preparing for the subcommittee meeting.
23. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 628-29 (1972).
24. Id. at 622.
25. Id. at 618.
26. Instead, the Court quoted selectively from the opinions below, professing, for example, to
agree with the First Circuit that Member and aide should be "treated as one." Id. at 616. The Court
also quoted the district court to the effect that the speech or debate clause barred inquiry into "things
done by Dr. Rodberg as the Senator's agent or assistant" that would have been privileged acts if
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The Court indicated that its holding was based on
what the Senate of the United States urgently presses here: that it is
literally impossible, in view of the complexities of the modern legis-
lative process . for Members of Congress to perform their legisla-
tive tasks without the help of aides and assistants; [and] that the day-
to-day work of such aides is so critical to the Members' performance
that they must be treated as the latter's alter ego .... 11
In fact, the Senate, in its brief to the Court, had proposed only that aides
be protected when "acting for their employer-Member.12  While the
Court did not explain its reasons for eliding from the importance of aides
to the necessity of automatically treating them as alter egos of Members, it
did assert in a general way that its holding furthered the "fundamental
purpose" of the speech or debate clause, that of "freeing the legislator
from executive and judicial oversight that realistically threatens to control
his conduct as a legislator.' ' 9 The Court added in a footnote that since an
aide's protection under the speech or debate clause is derivative of a Mem-
ber's privilege, the Member can override an aide's assertion of
immunity.1°
A. The Universe of Persons Eligible for Speech or Debate Clause
Protection
The Court in Gravel did not demarcate the class of per-
sons-"aides"-to which it had afforded speech or debate immunity. The
aide to whom protection was granted in Gravel was on the personal staff
of a Senator;3 he worked for that Senator only, and he was paid for his
work out of that Senator's allotment of salary money. There are other
aides who assist Members of Congress but who are not closely identified
carried out by the Senator, id. (quoting Doe, 332 F. Supp. at 937-38); the Court did not, however,
indicate that the district court had been referring, with the phrase "things done. . . as the Senator's
agent or assistant," to those activities that Rodberg had undertaken "at the Senator's direction," Doe,
332 F. Supp. at 938.
27. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616-17.
28. Brief for the Senate of United States at 11, United States v. Gravel, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). The
Court seems to have lifted from the Senate brief the idea that aides should be viewed as the alter egos
of Members; but while the Court assumes in its rhetoric and its holding that aides invariably act as
the alter egos of their legislator-superiors, the Senate was more circumspect: "A Representative or
Senator simply cannot function in the Congress without aides who are so intimately involved and
identified with him as to be in many instances his alter ego." Id. (emphasis added). What the Senate
had argued to the Court, then, was that aides should be eligible for speech or debate immunity only in
those instances in which the aides actually function, in the performance of legislative tasks, as the alter
egos of Members-that is, when the aides are "acting for their employer-Member." Id.
29. 408 U.S. at 618.
30. Id. at 622 n.13.
31.' Affidavit of Mike Gravel, Joint Appendix at 11, Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
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with any particular Member. To cope with its ever-expanding workload,32
Congress has created what some have termed a legislative bureau-
cracy 33-made up not only of personal aides, but also of committee and
subcommittee staffs, staff members of either House as a whole, and the
staff of auxiliary legislative agencies, such as the General Accounting Of-
fice and the Congressional Budget Office.3 ' Nearly 40,000 people are now
on the legislative branch payroll;" of these, only one quarter are personal
staff employees.3 6 In addition to paid staff, Members are often aided in
their legislative tasks by others who are not on the payroll, including in-
terns, fellows nominated and subsidized by outside organizations, mem-
bers of the academic community, and personal friends and associates of
Members."
In the absence of a definition of the term "aide," the Court's holding in
Gravel is susceptible to what might be called an underinclusive interpreta-
tion. Since the aide involved in the Gravel case was on the personal staff
of a Senator, and since the Court used a possessive pronoun ("his") to
indicate the postulated relationship between an aide and a Member, it
might be supposed that the Court intended to extend the protection of the
speech or debate clause principally to those who work on the personal
staffs of Members of Congress. 8 The Court's use of the term "alter ego"
would lend support to this thesis; a staff member of the General Account-
ing Office, for example, is not likely to function as the "alter ego" of an
32. See infra note 47.
33. See, e.g., M. MALBIN, UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES 4 (1980); Cameron, The Shadow Con-
gress the Public Doesn't Know, FORTUNE, Jan. 15, 1979, at 39.
34. See H. FOX, JR. & S. HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL STAFFS: THE INVISIBLE FORCE IN AIERI-
CAN LAWMAKING 130-42 (1977).
35. Id. at 3.
36. M. MAILBIN, supra note 33, at 256.
37. H. FOX, JR. & S, HAMMOND, supra note 34, at 137-39.
38. The Supreme Court has extended immunity in two cases since Gravel to congressional em-
ployees not on the personal staffs of Members. In Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973), the Court
held that the staff members of a House committee, including a consultant and a temporary investiga-
tor, were entitled to speech or debate clause protection for their work on hearings and a committee
report that described the disciplinary problems of specifically identified students in the District of
Columbia school system. Id. at 312. While the Court did not accord protection to the Superintendent
of Documents and the Public Printer, also named as defendants in the case for having distributed the
committee report both within and beyond Congress, the Court's decision in this regard rested on its
finding that public distribution of such a report fell outside the sphere of legislative activity compre-
hended by the speech or debate clause. Id. at 315-16. In Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund,
421 U.S. 491 (1975), the Court granted speech or debate immunity to the counsel of a Senate subcom-
mittee, observing that "[wle draw no distinction between the Members and the Chief Counsel." Id. at
507. Since committee staff members are typically hired by the chair or ranking minority member of
the committee on whose payroll they appear, R. RIPLEY, POWER IN THE SENATE 201-02 (1969), these
aides may be viewed as de facto personal staff assistants to the chair or ranking minority member.
The Court has yet to extend immunity to an aide to either House as a whole, or to a staff member of
an auxiliary legislative entity; these categories of legislative employees do not so readily fit, in their
"day-to-day work," Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616, the "alter ego" model set out in Gravel.
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individual Member of Congress."
This reading of the Gravel holding would have courts draw generalized
conclusions about the eligibility of congressional staff members for speech
or debate protection on the basis of organizational placement and typical
reporting relationships. Claims of staff immunity, however, arise in con-
nection with specific acts. In order to determine whether a Member's leg-
islative independence would be compromised by the questioning of a con-
gressional aide, it is necessary to focus analysis on the particular act at
issue, and to determine whether the linkage between the Member and the
aide was such with respect to that act that the independence of the legisla-
tor would be impinged upon by the proposed questioning.
Organization charts are inadequate guides for this sort of analysis. For
example, while an institutional legislative staff member-such as the
Clerk of the House or an analyst at the General Accounting Office-may
not have so comprehensive an identification with any particular Member
of Congress as to function as the Member's alter ego, he or she may on
occasion work with or for a Member on a particular legislative task.4"
Questioning an institutional aide about such a task could encroach upon a
legislator's independence just as much as questioning a member of the
legislator's personal staff about that task.41
B. Staff Autonomy
The standard set forth in Gravel permits congressional aides to assert
speech or debate protection for facially legislative acts that they undertake
of their own accord. This creates a serious potential for abuse; for exam-
ple, the clause may be used by aides to shield themselves from liability for
what would otherwise be treated as libels or tortious invasions of privacy.
As the Court has itself observed: "In its narrowest scope, the Clause is a
very large, albeit essential, grant of privilege. It has enabled reckless men
to slander and even destroy others with impunity, but that was the con-
scious choice of the Framers.142 The Framers surely did not anticipate,
39. For an instance of the underinclusiveness of Gravel, see In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587
F.2d 589, 597 (3rd Cir. 1978) ("Of course, in a very broad sense the Clerk [of the House] is an aide
to every member of the House; but his relationship with any particular member is not such that there
is a realistic possibility that questioning of him, hostile or friendly, will have an inhibiting effect upon
that member's performance.")
40. See H. FOX, JR. & S. HAMMOND, supra note 34, at 130-35.
41. Moreover, an institutional aide who works on a legislative project for multiple Members of
Congress-for example, a congressional committee or subcommittee, or a regional caucus-should not
be barred from speech or debate protection because he or she is serving more than one Member. If an
aide is eligible for speech or debate immunity where the legislative independence of one Member is at
stake, then a fortiori the aide should be eligible when the independence of more than one Member is
in danger.
42. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516 (1972) (footnote omitted).
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however, that the authority to invoke this privilege, and to avoid legal
accountability for misconduct, would be extended to many thousands of
unelected legislative employees.
The purposes of the speech or debate clause are served if a Member of
Congress asserts immunity in order to protect an aide from questioning
that could infringe upon the Member's legislative independence. But the
Court has offered no explanation of why, in order "to protect the integrity
of the legislative process," 43 it is necessary to extend to aides the authority
to invoke immunity under the clause for their own self-initiated activities.
Questioning of an aide in such circumstances does not "realistically
threaten to control [a Member's] conduct as a legislator.""
The Supreme Court seems to have assumed in framing the Gravel rule
that aides invariably work side-by-side with, and under the close supervi-
sion of, Members of Congress. That was apparently an accurate under-
standing of the working relationship between Gravel and Rodberg in con-
nection with the specific subcommittee meeting involved in the case. That
model of Member-staff interaction, however, does not square with every-
day experience in the reticular modem Congress. By any measure, the
workload of Congress has expanded enormously in the last several de-
cades.45 Staff sizes have been enlarged dramatically to keep pace." Con-
gressional aides now play vital roles in almost every aspect of the legisla-
tive process, from drafting bills and speeches to conducting
investigations. 7
43. Id. at 507.
44. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 618 (1972).
45. See H. FOX, JR. & S. HAMMOND, supra note 34, at 27; see also Huitt, The Internal Distri-
bution of Influence: The Senate, in THE CONGRESS AND AMERICA'S FUTURE 91, 112 (D. Truman ed.,
2d ed. 1973) (current workload would be "unthinkable" without expanded staff). Between the 85th
Congress (1957-58) and the 95th Congress (1977-78), the number of committee and subcommittee
meetings in the House of Representatives increased from 3,750 to 6,771; in the Senate, the number of
such meetings rose from 2,748 to 6,656. M. MALBIN, supra note 33, at 258. The number of recorded
votes increased during this period from 193 to 1540 in the House and from 313 to 1156 in the Senate.
Id.
Similarly, between the 80th Congress (1947-48) and the 94th Congress (1975-76), the number of
bills introduced in the House of Representatives rose from 7,611 to 16,982. COMMISSION ON ADMINIS-
TRATIVE REVIEW, ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANIZATION AND LEGISLATIVE MANAGEMENT, H.R. DOG.
NO. 232, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1977) [hereinafter cited as OBEY COMMISSION REPORT]. The
caseload level in the typical Representative's office-that is, the number of constituent problems inves-
tigated or mediated-doubled in the ten years between 1965 and 1975. Id. at 41. The volume of mail
Congressmen received tripled between 1969 and 1975. Id.
46. Between 1947 and 1976, for example, the number of committee staff members employed by
the Senate increased from 290 to 1,534. H. FOX, JR. & S. HAMMOND, supra noti 34, at 171. The
number employed by the House of Representatives rose from 193 to 1,548. Id. In the same period,
personal staff employees increased from 590 to 3,251 in the Senate and from 1,440 to 6,939 in the
House. Id. The number of staff members working for adjunct legislative entities underwent similar
growth. See M. MALBIN, supra note 33, at 257.
47.
In both House and Senate personal offices, six major activity clusters are found: administra-
tion, legislative, research, press, correspondence, and oversight. Committee aides' activities in-
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Moreover, recent studies 4 indicate that congressional staff members
have become increasingly autonomous and self-directed. Because the de-
mands on a typical Member of Congress are formidable, 49 Members have
delegated "enormous authority"50 to their aides, without having enough
time to supervise its exercise effectively."1 Thus, staff members often write
speeches that are directly inserted in the Congressional Record, or com-
mittee reports that are widely distributed, without these documents having
clude bill drafting, investigation, and dealing with lobbyists. Administrative, research, corre-
spondence, oversight, and some press functions are also performed.
H. FOX, JR., & S. HAIMMOND, supra note 34, at 88. See M. GREEN, WHO RUNS CONGRESS? 235 (3d
ed. 1979).
48. Prior to 1977, very little research had been done on the activities and impact of congressional
staff members. See M. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 56-57
(1977) ("Sad to say, the subject of the congressional staff is largely a neglected one."); H. FOX, JR. &
S. HAMMOND, supra note 34, at 5 ("In this array of literature [on Congress], little attention has been
given to congressional staffs and no systematic analysis made of their role in the legislative process.")
See also E. REDMAN, THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION 18 (1973) ("[Tlhe best-known academic works on
the Senate mention staff only in passing, if at all.") One notable exception was a monograph, K.
KOFMEHL, PROFESSIONAL STAFFS OF CONGRESS (1962), based on research done in the first six years
after passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (1946)
(authorizing hiring, for first time, of permanent professional staff members for congressional
committees).
Since 1977, two book-length studies of congressional staffs have appeared. H. FOX, JR. & S. HAM-
MOND, supra note 34; M. MALBIN, supra note 33. In addition, the significance of the roles played by
congressional aides in the legislative process has been somewhat more widely recognized and discussed
in both the general academic literature on Congress, see, e.g., R. JONES & P. WOLL, THE PRIVATE
WORLD OF CONGRESS 127-71 (1979), and the popular press, see, e.g. S. Rich, An Invisible Network
of Hill Power, WASHINGTON POST, March 20, 1977, at El; Cameron, supra note 33, at 38.
49. See OBEY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 45, at 10, 17. See also M. GREEN, supra note 47,
at 236 (1973 House study found that 38% of the time Members are scheduled to be in two or more
committee meetings simultaneously).
50. M. MALBIN, supra note 33, at 21. See C. CLAPP, THE CONGRESSMAN: HIS WORK AS HE
SEES IT 64 (1963); R. RIPLEY, supra note 38, at 213; Cameron, supra note 33, at 39.
51. A House commission found that the typical Representative spends only about 53 minutes in
the course of an average day with members of the Representative's personal or committee staffs. OBEY
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 45, at 18; see D. MATTHEWS, UNITED STATES SENATORS AND
THEIR WORLD 85 (1973) ("Even the Senator's own staff members find it 'a real battle to see him,'
and when they do it is likely to be for so short a period, and in competition with so many other
demands on his time ....") See also H. FOX, JR. & S. HAMMOND, supra note 34, at 157, 180 (one
result of increasing bureaucratization of congressional staffs is that fewer staff members have day-to-
day contact with Members). Other factors that militate against effective supervision and monitoring of
staff activities include the trend toward geographic dispersion of staff members, see M. FIORINA,
supra note 48, at 57-58 (increasing proportion of staff members located in state and district offices);
H. FOX, JR. & S. HAMMOND, supra note 34, at 111-12 ("Space is at such a premium that large staffs
may be housed in several different locations, in some cases, in as many as four different buildings.
Coordination of staff activity and communication is difficult."), and a lack of management experience
on the part of many Members, see Huitt, supra note 45, at 114 ("Few Senators are competent (and
some not at all, in fact) to operate a small bureaucracy of their own, and that is not their job
anyway.")
As a consequence of these various factors, and the sheer volume of work generated in congressional
offices, Members of Congress "cannot possibly keep track of all or even most of what goes on in their
name." M. MALBIN, supra note 33, at 21; see R. JONES & P. WOLL, supra note 48, at 144 (describ-
ing tendency of Senators with large staffs to "lose control" of those staffs). Staff members have come
more and more to operate as "independent professionals." H. FOX, JR. & S. HAMMOND, supra note
34, at 3.
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been read prior to publication by the Members of Congress for whom
they were ostensibly prepared.52 Aides also have a great deal of discretion
in running congressional investigations-in deciding what questions to ask
and of whom, what investigatory techniques to use, and what materials to
place on the public record."'
Staff members are hence in a position to vilify or embarrass those
whom they do not like or whose causes they oppose. Their temptation to
do so can only be increased if they are given the ability to invoke the
protection of the speech or debate clause on their own. Unlike Members
of Congress, congressional aides are not accountable to the electorate for
activities they engage in under the protection of legislative privilege.1
4
The Court indicated in Gravel that Members of Congress can repudi-
ate, and thereby override, assertions of speech or debate immunity ad-
vanced by their aides."5 That means, however, that the initial determina-
tion as to whether the invocation of immunity is necessary to protect a
legislator's independence may be made by a staff assistant, rather than by
the legislator-and often in circumstances in which the aide, interested in
avoiding legal liability or personal embarrassment, has incentives quite
apart from the legislator's independence to seek cover behind the speech or
debate clause. This prospect runs counter to the Court's insistence, ex-
pressed in other opinions, that the applicability of the clause be confined
to circumstances in which it may be presumed that a Member's legislative
independence is implicated." Unless a legislator is willing to affirm that
his or her own independence is affected by an inquiry or suit, it seems
safe to assume that it is not. To permit any legislative employee to invoke
the privilege in the first instance is to expand unnecessarily, and impru-
dently, what was intended to be a privilege personal to Members of
Congress.57
The ability of a Member of Congress to veto an aide's assertion of im-
52. See H. FOX, JR. & S. HAMMOND, supra note 34, at 145; M. MALBIN, supra note 33, at 143;
Cameron, supra note 33, at 39, 42.
53. See M. MALBIN, supra note 33, at 4. While personal, committee, and institutional staff mem-
bers all do some investigative work, it is notable that the number of investigative staff-that is, tempo-
rary staff members hired to work on particular congressional investigations-jumped in the House
from 33 in 1947 to 194 in 1960 to 910 in 1975. H. FOX, JR. & S. HAMMOND, supra note 34, at 24.
In the Senate, the number of investigative staff rose from 297 in 1960 to 1124 in 1975. Id; see E.
GRIFFITH & F. VALEO, CON;RE.MS: ITS CONTEMPORARY ROLE 97 (1975).
54. For observations related to this point, see R. JONES & P. WOLL, supra note 48, at 164 (argu-
ing that aides tend over time to become less keenly aware that their power is derivative); M. MALBIN,
supra note 33, at 5-6 (expressing concern about exercise of power by unelected aides, and about
resultant attenuation of linkage between preferences of electorate and activities of Congress).
55, 408 U.S. at 622 n.13.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 524 (1972).
57. The Court in Gravel acknowledged, in extending speech or debate protection to congressional
aides, that the privilege accorded an aide must be viewed "as the privilege of the Senator." 408 U.S. at
621-22.
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munity"8 cannot be relied upon to prevent abuse or to ensure that the
extension of immunity to congressional aides is confined to cases in which
the purposes of the speech or debate clause would be furthered. Once an
aide has invoked the protection of the clause, a Member may have no
compelling interest in revoking the assertion of immunity. Moreover, the
Member may in fact have reasons, unrelated to the safeguarding of legis-
lative independence, for not repudiating the aide's claim of privilege. For
example, the Member may be unsympathetic to the causes or claims of
those bringing suit, or may be concerned about the impact that repudia-
tion of the aide's assertion of privilege might have on the morale or effec-
tiveness of other staff members.
III. Proposal
To rectify the problems inherent in the Gravel standard, this Note pro-
poses a new standard: those who assist a Member of Congress in the per-
formance of a legislative function deemed to be within the protection of
the speech or debate clause, or who carry out such a function on behalf of
a Member, should be entitled to immunity under the clause where (a)
that immunity is invoked by the Member, and (b) the Member's motion
to dismiss a suit, or to quash a subpoena, includes an affirmation that the
aide was in fact acting on the Member's behalf.
The proposed standard differs from the Gravel standard in three crucial
respects. First, the proposed rule supplies a clear definition of the universe
of persons to whom speech or debate protection may be extended. The
suggested definition focuses on an individual's relationship to a specific
protected activity, rather than on his or her general, long-term relation-
ship with a Member of Congress. Under this approach to the definition of
eligibility, when a Member's legislative independence would be compro-
mised by the questioning of someone who helped the Member on some
legislative task, that person could be accorded immunity, and the Mem-
ber's independence safeguarded, whether or not the person in question
was on the Member's payroll or would generally be considered one of the
Member's aides.
Second, under the proposed standard, the authority to assert the speech
or debate privilege would be confined to those whose independence that
privilege was designed to assure: Senators and Representatives. Gravel
permits aides themselves to invoke the privilege, subject to the possibility
of repudiation by a Member; in effect, this means that whenever an aide
seeks to be protected from questioning about some facially legislative act,
the presumption is In favor of extending immunity to the aide. The rule
58. See id. at 622 n.13.
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suggested here would reverse this presumption; that is, the presumption
would be against the extension of immunity unless and until a member of
Congress invoked the speech or debate privilege to bar questioning of the
aide.
Third, the proposed rule would require that a Member affirm, in order
to protect an aide from questioning, that the aide had been acting on the
Member's behalf. That requirement would force the Member to take per-
sonal responsibility, formally and publicly, for the aide's activity; thus, a
Member is far less likely to assert immunity on an aide's behalf under the
proposed standard than he is likely silently to acquiesce in the aide's claim
of privilege under the Gravel standard. The resultant shift in the stakes,
and therefore the calculus, for Members would affect the expectations and
behavior of aides; with a decrease in the likelihood of immunity for acts of
dubious propriety, aides would be less likely to risk undertaking such acts.
Finally, the required affirmation, by affixing responsibility on the Mem-
ber, would facilitate recourse to what, in the absence of legal liability, is
certainly a venerable alternative remedy for congressional malversations:
electoral accountability.
